COMMENTS
Monopsony and Backward Integration: Section 2
Violations in the Buyer's Market
I.

INTRODUCTION

Monopsony and backward integration 2 are the converse of
the terms monopoly and forward integration. The former
terms refer to a condition or activity3 in the buyer's market,
the latter terms to a condition or activity in the supplier's market.4 While monopolization has received substantial judicial
and scholarly attention, its counterpart in the buyer's market,
monopsonization, has received little notice.5 This inattention
1. Monopsony is the economic term used to describe a market involving a buyer
with sufficient market power to exclude competitors and affect the price paid for its
product. In the buyer's market it is the counterpart to monopoly. Monopsony will
generally exist when there is a corresponding monopoly in the seller's market since all
firms in a market generally need to purchase similar products. Thus, if a monopoly is
held in the output market, the monopolist will generally hold monopsony power in the
input market. K. LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 232 (1969)
[hereinafter LANCASTER].

2. Vertical integration normally involves a producer's integration into the next
level of production, closer to the end use customer, e.g., a manufacturer may seek to
take over distribution of its product. This type of vertical integration is termed
forward integration. Backward integration occurs when the producer seeks to
integrate into its supply market, e.g., the manufacturer seeks to take over production
of its own source of supply. A firm will generally use monopoly power to integrate
forward and monopsony power to integrate backward. This Comment will use the
terms first and second market to distinguish between the market in which the market
power is initially held (first) from the market in which the power is being asserted
(second).
3. Monopsony is a condition, not an activity. The act of being a monopsonist is not
a violation of the antitrust laws; rather, the antitrust laws are violated by a
monopsonist's abuse of its monopsony power. See infra note 54 and accompanying
text. Backward integration is an activity that may violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.
4. The courts have often used the term "buyer's market" to identify a market in
which the buyer has substantial power. Monopsony is the extreme form of this power.
As used in this Comment the term "buyer's market" will refer to those situations in
which the buyer, rather than the supplier, is the primary actor.
5. The courts have occasionally recognized the distinction between a buyer's and
seller's market. See, e.g., Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 648 (D.
Md. 1979), affd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981) ("What
is unusual about this case is that it appears to present an example of monopsony
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to the basic difference between antitrust violations in the
buyer's and seller's markets under section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act 6 is unfortunate, and may often be legally fatal.7
The majority of antitrust claims arise from activity in the
seller's market.' Suppliers may be prohibited from setting the
price at which they will sell their products (price fixing), from
requiring the purchase of one product in order to acquire
another (tying), and, under certain conditions, from acquiring
rather than monopoly, and this feature serves to complicate not only the legal analysis
but the economic and policy aspects of the case as well."). Other courts and scholars
have noted the distinction while summarily rejecting any real difference. See, e.g.,
Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing a § 1
claim the court stated: "monopsony is as evil as monopoly"); 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 1 4.34 at, 201 (Callaghan 4th ed. 1981)
[hereinafter CALLMAN] ('The evils of price fixing are essentially the same whether
effected by the buyer (through monopsony or oligopsony) or the seller (through
monopoly or oligopoly)."); Note, Preferred Provider Organizations and Provider
Contracting; New Analysis Under the Sherman Act, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 385 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, New Analysis] ("Monopsony power, like monopoly power, generally
is presumed by the courts to be inherently dangerous to competition and public
welfare."). A recent article, however, has explored monopsony power in some detail.
See Rovner, Monopsony Power in Health Care Markets: Must the Big Buyer Beware
Hard Bargaining?,18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Rovner].
Interestingly, Congress and the Executive have acted affirmatively to counter the
consequent harm from excessive purchasing power. Thus, the feared abuse of
purchasing power was a major factor in passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1987). See infra note 15. Similarly, Congress recognized the propriety of
applying the antitrust laws to actions in the buyer's market by enacting the CapperVolstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1987). The Act permits "farmer-producers to ... fix
prices at which their cooperative will sell their produce... without thereby violating
the antitrust laws," in order to counter processors' purchasing power. Alexander v.
National Farmers Organization, 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960)).
The fear of monopsony has affected regulation in other areas as well. See, e.g.,
Associated Gas Distributors v. Federal Energy Regulation Comm., 824 F.2d 981, 995
(9th Cir. 1987) (Natural Gas Act "ended or sharply reduced pipeline monopsony power
over wellhead purchases, a power that had the tendency to keep wellhead prices below
competitive levels."); California Energy Conservation and Dev. Comm. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 831 F.2d 1467, 1479 (9th Cir. 1986) (Dissent asserted that court was
erroneously upholding regulatory agency's decision to protect Northwest energy
companies from an asserted exercise of monopsony power. Norris, J., dissenting,
stated, "If the Northwest energy companies believe that the Southwest utilities are
exercising some sort of unfair monopsony power, let them sue under the applicable
antitrust laws. It is not the mission of the BPA [Bonneville Power Administration] to
fight this battle for the Northwest utilities through the promulgation of a regionally
biased access policy.").
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1987).
7. See infra note 80.
8. As discussed infra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text, seller's claims against
purchasers have long been recognized under § 1, while monopsony claims under § 2
have not.
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their retail outlets (vertical integration). If these activities are
conducted in the buyer's market, however, they are rarely the
subject of an antitrust claim under section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. There is even legislative history indicating that
the Act was never intended to reach into the buyer's market.'
A seller's action may arise in the following manner: Seller
(S), a manufacturer of widgets, sells to Purchaser (P). P is the
sole purchaser of widgets. As a result of this monopsony, P
has the power to set the price it will pay for widgets. Since S
has no other market for its product, it is forced to sell at the
price P has set.
Courts, litigators, and the reader may believe it appropriate that P should be able to set the price at which it will
purchase its widgets without incurring antitrust liability. Initially, the arguments against recognition of a seller's claim
appear substantial. First, P may not have sufficient economic
incentive to use its monopsony power in an anticompetitive
manner. If P reduces the price it will pay for widgets below
S's cost, S would be required to continue selling at a loss. Yet,
prolonged loss-selling behavior does not appear either rational
or feasible from the viewpoint of either S or P. Since such an
action may force S out of business or into a different product
market because of continued loss selling, P would be left without a supplier-leaving little incentive for P to engage in such
anticompetitive conduct.'0 S's incentive to avoid loss-selling
behavior is more obvious.
9. Upon the formation of [the] bagging trust the cotton farmers ... agreed
that they would not purchase jute bagging, and by that agreement... the rich
reward anticipated by the ... trust [was] defeated. The fact that the bill ...
applie[d] to all arrangements.... by whomsoever made, would bring within its
reach all defensive agreements made by farmers for the purpose of enhancing
the price of their products.
20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (Statement of Senator George).
That is a very extraordinary proposition. There is nothing in the bill to prevent a refusal by anybody by buy anything. All that it says is that the people
producing or selling a particular article shall not make combinations to
advance the price of the necessaries of life.
20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (Statement of Senator Sherman).
Application of the antitrust laws to the buyer's market, however, was apparently
not that "extraordinary." When the Sherman Act was subsequently enacted, it was
applied to abuses in the buyer's market, involving concerted activity, without any discussion of legislative intent. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
400-02 (1905).
10. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 17 (Law. ed. 1985)
[hereinafter HOVENKAMP]. But see infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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Second, it has become axiomatic that the asserted purpose
antitrust laws is the protection of competition, not comthe
of
petitors.1 1 This asserted purpose may be construed to argue
against recognition of a claim in the buyer's market, since permitting P to obtain the lowest possible price for its widgets
12
would appear to embody the concept of free competition.
Conversely, prohibiting P from engaging in such activity may
only protect and safeguard S's profit margin. Reduction of a
business' net profit margin, however, is not the type of antitrust injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
3
Thus, in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., the Supreme
Court rejected on standing grounds a claim alleging behavior
that had the effect only of reducing the plaintiff's profit mar14
gin without adversely affecting competition.
Despite these arguments against recognition of antitrust
violations in the buyer's market, certain circumstances create a
condition in which the buyer's activities are anticompetitive
and of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
Exclusionary conduct is particularly susceptible to such a
claim. Thus, if P engages in more than mere price setting, and
predatorily sets its purchase price, refuses to deal, or vertically
integrates into S's market for the purpose of excluding either S
11. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). See also Shapiro v. General
Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 651 (D.C. Md. 1979) (Inventor's allegations that
oligopsony purchaser's activities denied them their proper profit did not state proper
antitrust claim. Plaintiff also lacked standing.), affd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981).
As noted by Justice Black:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open
to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
12. See, e.g., Brillhart v. Mutual Medical Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1985)
(antitrust laws do not prohibit a buyer from bargaining for the best deal possible).
The Supreme Court has expressly held, however, that standing is not limited to
puchasers. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. See also infra note 16.
13. 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
14. Id. See also Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield, 544 F. Supp. 230, 235
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (In dismissing a seller's action, the court noted that "The failure to
make more money . . . is simply not the kind of problem which the antitrust laws
address."), affd, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
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or a competitor at P's own level, P will have violated the antitrust laws.
This Comment will focus on the application of section 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act to actions in the buyer's market. 5
After briefly reviewing general antitrust law, this Comment
will explore the status of antitrust claims in the buyer's market under both section 1 and section 2. The necessary elements of a section 2 monopsony claim will then be reviewed
with particular emphasis on the types of buyer activities that
might support a seller's claim under this section. As will be
shown, the anticompetitive effect of these activities provides
the major distinction between actions in the buyer's and
seller's market. Despite these distinctions, monopsony claims
are cognizable under section 2, particularly when exclusionary
activities are involved. The viability of such a claim may not
be immediately apparent and should be carefully considered by
litigants and thoughtfully reviewed by the courts. The
Supreme Court's most recent review of anticompetitive injury
in Cargill,"1 and the Court's adoption of stricter summary judg-

15. This Comment does not address several types of actions under § 2, such as
tying and reciprocal dealing arrangements, which may also provide a seller with relief.
In addition, this Comment does not address application of the Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1987), which contains specific provisions addressing buyer's conduct
regarding illegal payments, allowances or services. Section 13(f) states: "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this
section." 15 U.S.C. 13(f) (1987). Another statute not addressed in this Comment, § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1987), prohibits unfair
methods of competition, and has been used to prohibit a buyer from inducing a seller
to provide it with promotional allowances or services. See, e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc. v.
FTC, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974). Private litigants may not bring suit under § 5 of the
FTCA, however. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1987), private litigants may bring an
action for treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 13(f). Just as under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, however, a seller may have a difficult time alleging and proving an
anticompetitive injury sufficient to support standing to sue. Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.D.C. 1988). For more on buyer's liability under the RobinsonPatman Act, see C. HILLS, ANTrIRusT ADVISER 301-11 (1985) [hereinafter HILLSJ.
16. 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986). The Cargill Court reviewed the standing requirement of
antitrust injury under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 326 (1987), relating to
mergers. Claims brought under the Sherman Act must meet the standing
requirements of § 4 of the Clayton Act. While the standing analysis under § 4 is not
identical to that required under § 16, the requirement of antitrust injury is
substantially similar.
A seller's claim may not merely assert that the plaintiff is receiving less money
than it normally would. This alone merely states a harm to a competitor and is not
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7
ment standards in Matsushita Elec. Ind. v. Zenith Radio,
however, make it imperative that litigants recognize, plead,
and prove the proper antitrust injury and effect when pursuing
8
a claim in the buyer's market."

itself an anticompetitive injury. See, e.g., Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,687 at 58,520 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
In certain circuits, however, financial injury to the plaintiff may be sufficient. See
Syufy Enter. v. American Multi-cinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 876 (1987); Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1347
(9th Cir. 1986); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 580 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). As noted in Hasbrouk v. Texaco, Inc., 830 F.2d
1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987), "The purpose of drawing a distinction between harm to
competition and harm to competitors is to point out that not all acts that harm
competitors harm competition.... Competition does not exist in a vacuum; it consists
of rivalry among competitors. Clearly, injury to competitors may be probative of harm
F.2d
to competition ... " See also Bell Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp., Inc., 784
to
1315, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Sometimes injury to rival firms can be a presursor [sic]
output
curtail
may
a
firm
market,
the
of
out
rivals
knocking
injury to consumers; after
and raise price."). The plaintiff's claim in Hasbrouk was brought under the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1987).
In addition to requiring antitrust injury for standing under the Sherman Act,
some courts have dismissed a seller's claim on the basis of the Supreme Court's
rejection of the offensive use of the passing-on defense. See Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois Brick, the court held that a secondary
purchaser did not have standing to sue under the antitrust laws - only the direct
purchaser could recover. (An exception to this statement arises when the secondary
purchaser purchased on a cost-plus basis.) In the buyer's market this has been called
the "Pass-back" defense, where "what is being passed-on is lower prices rather than
higher prices." Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 649 n.10 (D. Md.
In
1979), affd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981). See also
re Beef Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1159 (5th Cir. 1979) ("We conclude that
there is nothing special about monopsony or oligopsony price-fixing cases that justifies
treating them differently from monopoly price-fixing cases for passing-on purposes."
1
Court found that sellers had no standing against indirect purchasers of beef.);
4.48 at Supp. 167; Note, Monopsonistic Price Fixing and
CALLIMAN, supra note 5,
Umbrella Pricingas a Theory of Antitrust Standing: A New View of Illinois Brick, 50
U. CIN. L. REV. 52 (1981).
17. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In reviewing plaintiff's § 1 claim, the Matsushita Court
held that to overcome an antitrust summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must
establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the petitioner
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused the plaintiff to suffer a cognizable
antitrust injury. If the factual context renders the plaintiff's claim implausible, i.e. the
to
claims make no economic sense, the plaintiff must offer more persuasive evidence
1,
§
under
brought
is
claim
the
If
necessary.
be
support its claim than would otherwise
such evidence must "tend to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators
acted independently. Although the Court was addressing a § 1 rather than a § 2 action,
the summary judgment standard should be analagous.
a
18. As will be seen there may be a decreased incentive and opportunity for
monopsonist to abuse its power. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. The
eomplainant should be careful to allege, where applicable, the requisite circumstances
which a monopsonist's actions would be anticompetitive in order to escape dismissal
J-,.'summary judgment.

Throughout this Comment the author emphasizes the requirements for defeating
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II.

693

ANTITRUST OVERVIEW

Despite the plethora of antitrust statutes,

9

the Sherman

Antitrust Act remains central to antitrust analysis. Claims
brought under the Act generally allege a violation of either
section 1 or section 2. Section 1 provides that "every contract,
combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... among
the several states . . .is . . .illegal."'
Section 2 provides that

"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . .. any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ...shall be deemed guilty ... .,"21 The major distinction
between these provisions is that while section 1 violations
require an agreement between two or more people, section 2
violations reach the unilateral action of a party who possesses
or attempts to gain monopoly or monopsony power.
Antitrlist violations under section 1 are analyzed under
either the per se rule or the rule of reason. An activity that is
illegal per se will not be reviewed by the court for its anticompetitive effect; the plaintiff will only need to prove that the
defendant engaged in the activity.2 In contrast, the rule of
reason requires an in-depth review of the activity's anticompetitive effect in the particular application confronting the court.
The per se rule is limited to "agreements or practices that,
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Emphasis on pre-trial motions does not
indicate a lack of concern over trial activities but merely indicates that antitrust
actions, particularly those based on conduct in the buyer's market, may be particularly
susceptible to such pre-trial motions. See, e.g., Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions
to Dismiss and Other Examples of EquilibriatingTendencies in the Antitrust System,
74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1390
(1976) (exclusively procedural); Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1936) (prohibiting discriminatory practices in the sale of commodities);
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1011-1015 (1945) (providing for state regulation
and taxation of insurance industry and limited immunity from antitrust laws); CapperVolstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § § 291-292 (1922); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 61-65
(1918) (granting export associations a qualified exemption from antitrust laws);
Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. 12-27 (1914); FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 41-77 (1914).
20. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1987), states in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
21. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1987), states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony....
22. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry about
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use."2 3 The per se rule will apply only to a particular
activity after the court has had "experience with a particular
kind of restraint... [and may reach] a conclusive presumption
that the restraint is unreasonable. 2 4 Those activities falling
within the per se category have been limited in recent years,
and the rule will generally apply only to horizontal arrangements2" under section 1 that involve activities such as price fixing,26 division of markets,2 7 group boycotts,"- or tying
arrangements. 29
If an activity has not been declared illegal per se, the
court, in reviewing a section 1 claim, will evaluate the practice
under the rule of reason. The rule of reason requires the court
to review the competitive effects of the business practice and
weigh any potential benefits against the practice's negative
While the rule of reason analysis
effect on competition.'
under section 1 is not identical to the anticompetitive effects
analysis conducted under section 2, the competitive objectives
and economic goals are similar. In recent years, the Chicago
School of Economics, with proponents such as Areeda and Turner, Judge Robert Bork, and Judge Richard Posner, has domi23. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (Black, J.).
24. Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
25. Horizontal arrangements are agreements among competitors at the same level,
e.g., manufacturers conspiring to set the price at which they will sell to all retailers.
Vertical arrangements are agreements between those at different levels of the
marketing-manufacturing structure, e.g., a distributor and its retailer conspiring to set
the price at which they will sell products within a certain region. Vertical
arrangements are considered to have potential benefits not present in horizontal
arrangements. Thus, they are generally reviewed under the rule of reason, and are
not considered illegal per se. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E.-Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (market division). Some vertical arrangements that set prices or price
levels to be charged, such as re-sale price maintenance agreements, are still considered
illegal per se. They are, however, increasingly scrutinized. Compare Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) with Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968). See also Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515
(1988).
26. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); but see NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
27. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal).
28. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985).
29. Jefferson Parrish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
30. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).
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nated this analysis. While each of these proponents has his
own variation on this school of thought, each has participated
in the shift of focus away from the goal of free competition
through decentralization. 3 Rather, the Chicago School focuses
on consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust law. 2 Emphasis
is placed on whether the activity decreases output and
increases prices. If the activity does not have this effect, then
the activity does not have an anticompetitive effect, and thus
does not violate the antitrust laws.3 3
Often the tests of decreased output or increased price do
not address the anticompetitive effect of exclusionary conduct.
Thus, Krattenmaker and Salop have recently argued that
claims of anticompetitive exclusion should be judged according
to whether the challenged activity places competitors at a cost
disadvantage sufficient to allow the defendant firm to exercise
monopoly power by raising its prices.' This test requires the
court to ask first "whether the challenged conduct unavoidably
and significantly increases the cost of competitors," and second
"whether raising rivals' costs enables the firm to exercise market power-that is, raise prices above the competitive level." 35
The approach taken by the monopsony plaintiff in alleging
31. Decentralization is the promotion and protection of small, local business. The
earlier emphasis on small business is exemplified by the statement in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), that Congress enacted the antitrust laws "to
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses." In this Comment, "Chicago School of Economics" or "Chicago School of
thought" is used in its broadest sense to identify the recent emphasis on economics in
defining the goals of antitrust law. This shift in emphasis has been recognized by both
courts and commentators. See Continental Television v. GTE-Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 5456, 58-59 (1977); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST ch.2A (1977)
[hereinafter SULLIVAN]; Fox, The Modernization of AntitrussL A New Equilibrium,66

CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1985). See also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g.,
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okl a, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984)
(consumer welfare a "fundamental goal of antitrust law"); 1 AREEDA & TURNER,
ANTITRUST

LAw

7

(1978)

[hereinafter

AREEDA

&

TURNER,

ANTITRUST

LAW]

("economic objective . . . is to maximize consumer economic welfare"); R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 72-89 (1978) [hereinafter BORK].
33. 1 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 32, at

103-13;

HOVENKAMI, supra note 10, at 49.
34. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals Costs to
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 208, 214 (1986) [hereinafter Krattenmaker &
Salop]. Although Krattenmaker's and Salop's article was not directed at activities
under § 2, the test is equally applicable. Id. at 218 ("[olur analytical framework also
applies to exclusion cases arising from the conduct of a single firm.").
35. Krattenmaker & Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 71. 74 (1987).
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anticompetitive effect will vary depending on the school of
thought adopted by the court. One commentator, relying
exclusively on the Chicago School, has argued that monopsony
3
should be considered legal per se. " The Chicago School's
emphasis on consumer welfare will often obscure the harm to
competition caused by exclusionary activities-particularly in
the buyer's market. Thus, when the monopsonist's activities
are exclusionary, it may be more appropriate to apply the
37
Krattenmaker

and Salop variant of raising rivals'

costs,

rather than Areeda and Turner's monopsony anticompetitive
effects test discussed below. Conversely, litigants may attempt
to rely on theories of decentralization and the promotion of
36. Rovner, supra note 5, at 860. Rovner concedes that monopsony may
"theoretically cause economic inefficiencies." Id. at 883. He believes, however, that
"the judicial system lacks devices sufficiently delicate to detect the difference between
hard bargaining and abuse of buying power." Id. He further believes "that the
reliance upon the jury to determine the inferences to be drawn from the evidence is
'inherently imperfect.'" Id. at 884. Rovner does not rely on the complicated economics
involved in antitrust cases, but rather on the jury's ability or inability to make an
inference from the facts. This role, however, is precisely that of the jury in every trial.
Rovner states that "[t]he cost of a mistake in making that determination is very high
in terms of social welfare." Id. Yet in criminal trials, juries are called upon to draw
an inference from the defendant's conduct or other circumstantial evidence. Is
economic social welfare so much more important than the criminal defendant's
welfare? While utilitarianism may argue affirmatively, the question need not be
answered here. The jury system is an institution that the American people and courts
rely upon daily, and it can surely be relied upon to determine whether the defendant
has merely engaged in "hard bargaining" or has acted with the general intent of
abusing its buying power. See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484,
495 (1986) (while recognizing "mistaken inferences" that might be made from
mechanisms that may be either competitive or anticompetitive, court rejected per se
rule in favor of evaluating such claims with care).
To declare a monopsonist's activities legal per se is to give unscrupulous
companies rein to take advantage of those situations in which such conduct is
anticompetitive. Interestingly, the call for per se legality has been raised for other
activities as well. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts: An
Argument for a Per Se Rule of Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 TEX. L. REV. 415
(1980). Judge Bork, for example, has argued for a rule of per se legality for predatory
pricing. BORK, supra note 32, at 154 (expressly rejecting Areeda and Turner's
prevailing objective test, which shifts the burden of proof as the probability of such
behavior shifts). See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. Legality per se has
never been adopted by the courts in the case of predatory pricing or any other activity.
See, e.g., Cargill,107 S. Ct. at 495 (rejecting per se rule denying competitors standing to
challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory pricing theories). Although not
discussed by Rovner, shifting the burden of proof in such circumstances would appear
more appropriate than declaring such activity legal per se. This Comment, however,
rejects either approach. With a fuller understanding of the potential for abuse in
monopsony power, both the jury and the court may identify those circumstances,
particularly when exclusionary conduct is shown, in which abuse of monopsony power
has occurred.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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small business when alleging
applying tests enunciated by
tenmaker and Salop, however,
ble theory even under the
antitrust law. 38
III.

an anticompetitive effect. By
Areeda and Turner, or Kratmonopsonization remains a viacurrent economic tenants of

ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE BUYER'S MARKET

One of the first Supreme Court cases to recognize an antitrust violation in the buyer's market. was Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co. 3 9 In Mandeville
Island, sugar beet growers brought a conspiracy claim against
several refiners under section 1 and section 2. The claim
alleged that the refiners had conspired to set the price at
which they would purchase sugar beets. The Court held that
the refiners had violated the Sherman Act. As noted by the
Court,
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or
to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it
immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of
these. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.40

As a result of the Court's decision in Mandeville Island, concerted action in the form of buyer cartels has generally been
accorded the same antitrust treatment as any form of horizontal collusion under section 1.41 Abuse of a single purchaser's
38. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
39. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
40. Id. at 236.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(agreement among competitors to purchase gasoline on spot market in order to check
rapid decline in prices violated § 1); National Macaroni Manufacturers Ass'n v. FTC,
345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 532
F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (practice of splits whereby film exhibitors agreed to
divide up future films was per se violation of § 1). While some courts will adhere to
the per se rule of illegality used in Mandeville Island, occasionally the court will apply
the rule of reason. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (agreement
between NCAA and broadcasters, which had effect of providing only one buyer, would
ordinarily be held illegal per se under § 1, but was reviewable under rule of reason
because the restraint involved an industry in which horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if product is to be available at all); Vogel v. American Soc'y
of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (appraiser association's adoption of by-laws
that set fee structure was not a per se violation, but court recognized that such
arrangements usually are).
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monopsony power under section 2, however, has only recently
42
been accorded attention by the courts.
The majority of claims based on a single purchaser's activ4
ity in the buyer's market have involved insurance programs. "
Whether the claim is based on a health insurance company's
refusal to pay more than a set price for health care or prescriptions, 44 or an automobile insurer's refusal to pay more than a
set price for repairs,4 5 litigants have generally attempted to
bring their claims under section 1 by alleging some form of
concerted activity. Litigants' failure, or inability, to allege a
single purchaser's abuse of monopsony power under section 2
has led to dismissal, summary judgment, or a restatement by
the court of the proper claim."
Certain situations may, of course, present a valid section 1
claim. A combination of facts may prove a conspiracy and
transform action previously perceived as unilateral into a cognizable section 1 claim. In the health insurer example, a horifeezontal section 1 violation might be proved if the insurer's
47 A vertical
providers.
service
by
setting board was controlled
42. Although the claims in Mandeville Island were brought under both § 1 and
a §2
§ 2, the § 2 claim was limited to conspiracy and thus did not directly sanction
Inc.,
monopsony claim. See Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance
Island:
Mandeville
to
analogy
(rejecting
784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986)
"Mandeville was a conspiracy to depress prices, and price-fixing cartels are unlawful
independent of their efficacy.").
are
43. Professional sports have also been an area in which monopsony claims
F.2d
prevalent. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807
noted that
520, 532 n.9 (7th Cir. 1986) (although monopsony was not alleged the court
be
"[i]f the relevant market were the market for franchises, the charge would
the
Meets
Baseball
Organized
Manpower:
in
Monopsony
Note,
");
monopsony ..
Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953).
44. See Rovner, supra note 5.
(7th Cir.
45. Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1204
Automobile
Mutual
Farm
State
v.
Proctor
(1982);
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1020
Aetna
Insurance Co., 675 F.2d 308, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Custom Auto Body, Inc. v.
1983).
R.I.
(D.C.
65,629
(CCH)
Cas.
Casualty and Surety Co., 1983-2 Trade
(9th
46. See infra note 107. In Barry v. Blue Cross of California, 805 F.2d 866, 874
concerning
data
no
"produced
but
Cir. 1986), the plaintiff alleged monopsonization
of
Blue Cross's share of the medical insurance in California or in any region
was
share
market
16%
that
found
California." Relying on other evidence the court
insufficient to survive summary judgment.
Cir.
47. See, e.g., Ratino v. Medical Service of Dist. of Columbia, 718 F.2d 1260 (4th
physicians);
participating
of
approval
without
plan
alter
not
1983) (board would
1987-2 Trade
Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan,
Care Inc.,
Medical
Valley
Genesee
v.
Addino
1987);
Mich.
(E.D.
Cas. (CCH) 67,687
593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)'(majority of physicians controlled critical committees
Dental Ass'n
that set rates, membership and board composition). But see Pennsylvania
v. Medical Service Ass'n of Pennsylvania, 745 F.2d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 1984) (although
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section 1 violation may be shown if the contract between the
insurer and service provider set the price that providers charge
their patients.4 8
Proof of conspiracy is difficult and has defeated many
claims in the buyer's market. 49 The Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite5P and Northwest Wholesale Stationers"l have made the requisite proof element
increasingly difficult. In view of the increasing difficulty in
proving conspiracy, it is essential that antitrust litigants seriously review, and consider, a potential section 2 claim.
IV.

SECTION TWO-MONOPSONIZATION

Section 2 claims are not subject to a per se analysis s2 In
order to state a claim of either monopolization or monopsonization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) possession of monopoly (or monopsony) power in
the relevant geographic and product market; and, (2) willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
a justifiable business decision (general intent).' Thus, the
providers constituted a majority of the review and policy committees, these
competitors were only one sixteenth of the board). See also Note, New Analysis, supra
note 5, at 392 n.114 and cases cited therein.
For a review of evidence tending towards a finding of concerted action, see Custom
Autobody, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69, 181. Custom Autobody also contains a review
of the horizontal effects of vertical agreements in the automobile insurance industry.
Id. 1983-2 Trade Cas. at 69,185 n.11.
48. In this example, the insurer and provider would be in a vertical relationship,
and the fixed fee agreement would be considered resale price maintenance ("RPM").
See, e.g., Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 US. 205 (1979).
Many of these cases, however, have been rejected for lack of a resale component. See,
e.g., Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc., v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Connecticut, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D. Conn. 1981), affd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.
1982).
49. See, e.g., Garshman,641 F. Supp. at 1370; Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472
F. Supp. 636, 642 (D. Md. 1979) (alleged conspiracy by automobile manufacturers to
deny inventors royalties), offd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 909
(1981). See also Barry, 805 F.2d at 870 (horizontal agreement not proved, but express
vertical agreement found). But see Custom Autobody, 1983-2 Trade Cas. at 69, 181-82
(agreement could be proved).
50. Monsanto Company v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
51. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985).
52. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUsT LAW, supra note 32, 965(a) at 205.
53. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Garshman v.
Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.N.J. 1986) (charge of
monopsonization in the purchase of natural gas).
An attempted monopsonization claim may also be alleged under § 2. This analysis,
however, will focus exclusively on monopsonization claims. Although attempted
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mere possession of a monopoly or monopsony does not constitute the offense of monopolization (monopsonization)-rather,
there must be abuse of that power.' The ultimate question in
such a claim is whether the monopolist's (or monopsonist's)
activity has an anticompetitive effect. Claims involving abuse
of existing monopsony power may be based on a variety of
activities including price fixing, refusals to deal, and vertical
integration. Each of these areas is subject to its own particular
analysis and will be reviewed in greater detail below.'
monopsonization claims have been made for violations in the buyer's market, they
have generally fallen at the heels of the anticompetitive effect analysis.
In DeModena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985), the court dismissed the plaintiff seller's attempted
monopolization claim. The court found no evidence of predatory intent or coercion. Id.
at 1395.
54. HiLLS, supra note 15, at 28.
55. An additional cause of action may be monopoly leveraging or, in this case,
monopsony leveraging. The courts have clearly condemned the use of monopoly
power in one market to obtain a monopoly in a second market. United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (geographic market); Smith Kline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.) (tying sale of product for which there was no competition with
one for which there was competition), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978). See also
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (use of
monopoly power in one market abused when defendant refused to sell rival
monopolized goods for use in second market); Poster Exchange Inc. v. National Screen
Service Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1970) (monopoly power at manufacturing
level used to eliminate competition at distributor-jobber level), cert denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1971); R. GviNS, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH § 3.08 (1983) [hereinafter
GIVINS]. Some courts, however, have extended this doctrine to condemn the use of
monopoly power to obtain merely a competitive advantage and not a monopoly
position in the second market. Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). This antitrust theory is called
monopoly (monopsony) leveraging and may provide a secondary cause of action.
The elements of this action have been defined as follows: (1) monopoly power in a
relevant market; (2) challenged activities in a market distinct from the first market;
(3) use of monopoly power rather than mere employment of other advantages that the
monopolist enjoys by virtue of size, integration or other similar factors;
(4) unwarranted competitive advantage in the leveraged market; and, (5) causal
antitrust injury. Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing Grayson Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 571 F. Supp. 1504,
1518-19 (E.D. Cal. 1983)). See also Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
771 F.2d 672 (2nd Cir. 1985).
Courts and commentators are generally reluctant to adopt this theory because it is
viewed as prohibiting "any competitive advantage in another market." Catlin, 791 F.2d
at 1349. The Grayson Electric formulation reviewed by the Catlin court, however,
distinguished proper and improper use of monopoly power. Id. Berkey Photo itself
may be construed in this more restricted sense. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276
(finding no violation when a company obtains benefits from efficient size, integration
or competitive advantages derived from its broad based activities).
This reluctance, however, has led many courts to specifically refuse to adopt the
theory until decision of the question is necessary. See Catlin v. Washington Energy
Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Ass'n for Intercollegiate Athletics for
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A.

Market Power

The market power requirement of a monopsony or monopoly claim recognizes that a firm without such power has no
alternative but to accept or reject the market price.s If a firm
has sufficient market power, however, it has the ability to control prices and exclude competition, 7 and may thus have an
anticompetitive effect on the marketplace. Formal economic
analysis defines market power as a function of elasticity of
demand or, in the case of monopsony, elasticity of supply.8
This formal analysis is not used by the courts, however,
because the elasticity of supply or demand cannot be computed
in litigation.5 9 Thus, the majority of courts have adopted a
market share analysis as a substitute.60
The market share test requires a determination of the relevant market in which to measure the firm's market share.
Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 586 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (use of monopoly power in
dues and proceeds policies did not constitute monopoly leveraging where causal
relationship not proven).
Monopoly leveraging is generally used to refer to anticompetitive activities
involving completely separate product or geographic markets rather than markets at
different levels of the market structure where vertical integration might occur. One
court, however, has adopted this theory to condemn anticompetitive procurement
practices. See United States v. AT & T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See
also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101-10 (1948) (large movie chain used
combined buying power to acquire exclusive privileges from licensors); United States
v. Cresent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) (through use of their buying power,
motion picture exhibitors conspired to monopolize exhibition of films in certain
geographical areas).
56. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 86 (2d ed. 1981).
57. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (hereinafter Alcoa].
58. E.I. duPont, 351 U.S. at 394. See also 4 AHEEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 32,
964(b). Elasticity of demand refers to the variance in quantity
demanded in response to a change in price. Conversely, the elasticity of supply refers
to the variance in quantity supplied in response to a change in price. Often the degree
of change is due to the availability of substitutes, and sometimes to the ability to do
without the item. If the demand is inelastic, a change in price will have relatively little
effect upon demand. Luxury items are generally considered relatively elastic, while
staples are relatively inelastic.
59. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 17. The inability to quantify economic concepts
has led the courts to adopt substitute tests in other areas as well. See, e.g., infra note
122 (accounting terms used instead of economic when identifying "appropriate cost").
60. HILLS,supra note 15, at 29. In Alcoa, 148 F. Supp. at 424, Judge Learned Hand
stated that a firm has a monopoly it if sells over 90% of the relevant market. If a firm
sells 60-64%, it is doubtful that it has a monopoly, and 33% is clearly not a monopoly.
The Krattenmaker and Salop test for exclusionary conduct, discussed supra notes 3435 and accompanying text, is a market power test and uses market share only as
another factor. Salop, New Economic Theories of Anticompetitive EZclusion, 56
ANTrrRuST L.J. 57, 62 (1987) [hereinafter Salop, New Economic Theories].
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The relevant market is defined to include all sales that directly
6
affect the defendant's pricing decisions. ' While the relevant
market may not generally be defined with reference to a single
purchaser, a single purchaser may qualify if monopsony power
is alleged.62
In defining the relevant market, it is necessary to first
determine the relevant product market, and second, the relevant geographic market. The test for determining the relevant
product market generally requires a consideration of the "rea63 "Cross-elasticity of
sonable interchangeability" of products.
demand"" or, "cross-elasticity of supply," is a significant indicator of a product market's boundaries.'S In the case of
monopoly, the relevant geographic market is the area in which
competitors compete for purchasers; in the case of monopsony,
sellers.6
it is the area in which competitors compete for
Once the relevant markets are defined, the court must
determine what share of the market would give the entity
power to control prices or exclude competition within the relevant market. There is no set percentage which the court will
apply;6 7 in various cases, a sufficient percentage may vary from
90 percent to less than 50 percent.s The number of other
firms in the market and the distribution of market shares
61. E.I. duPont, 351 U.S. at 393-94; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424-25.
62. Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Business Mach., 777 F.2d 306, 320 n.46 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 73 (1986). Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 794
n.64 (1968) ("[m]onopsony is the term used to describe a situation in which the
relevant market for a factor of production is dominated by a single purchaser.").
63. E.I. duPont, 351 U.S. at 400.
64. Cross elasticity of demand refers to the interdependence among different
products. If a slight increase in price would influence buyers to switch from one
product to another when product substitutes are readily available, then the cross
elasticity of demand is considered to be fairly high. If there is no substitute for a
particular product, and purchasers are not responsive to price, then there will be little
cross elasticity of demand. See id. Similarly, if a slight decrease in price would
influence sellers to withdraw their product and produce another, the cross-elasticity of
supply is fairly high. If the supplier is unable to easily switch to production of another
product, and the supplier does not readily respond to price changes, there is little
cross-elasticity of supply.
65. Id. at 394-95.
66. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See also VON

TRADE
ANTITRUST LAWS AND
KALwOWSm, 16B BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
KALINOWSKI].
VON
[hereinafter
1988)
(Bender
8.02[2](b
REGULATION
67. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 416.
68. Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d
1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975) (45-70%), cert denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Yoder Bros., Inc. v.
California Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367-68 n.19 (5th Cir. 1976) (no rigid rule
requiring 50%, but 20% insufficient), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
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among these firms are factors used in determining the percentage that will give the firm monopoly or monopsony power.6 9
Determination of monopsony power may not be identical
to that of monopoly power. In reviewing presumptive illegality
based on market shares for merging companies, Areeda and
Turner have noted that the "aggregate share of presumptive
illegality should be considerably higher than that for the selling side."7 0 For presumptive illegality, the commodity should
be produced under significantly increasing costs, and the merging firms' aggregate purchasing share should be at least 25
percent. 1
On the selling side, monopoly will produce anticompetitive
effects whether the product is produced at either constant or
increasing costs. 72 On the buying side, however, Areeda and
Turner argue that monopsony will not result in decreased
purchases if prices are constant. In such a situation, both a
monopsonist and a competitive purchaser have an incentive to
purchase the quantity of product that would equal the supply
cost. If the product is produced pursuant to increasing costs,
however, a monopsonist may capture greater monopsonistic
profits by buying less than a competitive purchaser.73 A small
purchaser will not vary its buying habits whether dealing with
a supplier with constant costs or one with increasing costs. Its
price will remain constant since it has insufficient market
power to affect price. For a monopsonist (the sole purchaser),
however, the increase in cost will be reflected in its increased
purchases. Thus, there is an incentive to reduce purchases to a
69. A larger market share in a market with numerous small competitors will
suggest greater power than if there are only one or two competitors. Additionally, a
monopolist or monopsonist will have no lasting power over price, despite its present
market share, if there are no barriers to entry. Courts and commentators have
increasingly recognized that market share is only one factor in determining market
power. See GIVENS, supra note 55, § 3.01, at 3-5; Salop, New Economic Theories, supra
note 60, at 62.
70. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 32, $ 965a.

71. Id. In one case concerning this issue, United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F.
Supp. 962, 969 (W.D. Pa. 1965), the buyer concentration of the merging firms was 50%
with one other firm possessing 43%. An injunction was issued to prevent the merger
under § 7 of the Clayton Act. In Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484
(1986), the court appeared to look only at the firm's post-merger concentration in the
output market, 21%, and did not look at its concentration in the buyer's market. The
Court denied an injunction. The claim, however, alleged that "[clompetition in the
markets for procurement of feed cattle and the sale of boxed beef will be substantially
lessened ..
" Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 32, f, 964a.
73. Id. at 202.
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level at which the marginal increase in cost equals the marginal increase in revenue.7 4
While market share percentages for merger are not synonymous with those of monopoly or monopsony, the factors arguing in favor of a higher market share for determination of
5 The courts, however, have
monopsony power are similar.
never explicitly required a higher market share when confronted with a monopsony case, as opposed to a monopoly case.
While the courts may have implicitly recognized the difference
in determining the percentage that would give the firm control, or create an anticompetitive effect, the difference has
never been articulated.7 6 Thus, in Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Massachusetts,Inc., the court applied the same standard as in a
general monopoly case and found 74 percent of the relevant
market to be sufficient to give the organization market
power." Conversely, in Barry v. Blue Cross of California,the
Ninth Circuit found 16 percent of the relevant market to be
insufficient by analogy to a case involving monopoly, rather
than, monopsony power. 8
If the firm's activities are exclusionary, the firm may have
an incentive to engage in anticompetitive pricing even when it
79
The
is not dealing with a supplier with increasing costs.
to
desire
a
monopsonist's incentive derives not only from
increase monopsonistic profits, but also from a desire to
exclude competition at either level of the production-distribu74. Id. at 202-03 n.2. See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 91 (1974) [hereinafter POSNER] ("Just as the seller has an incentive
to limit output in order to increase his price and profits, so the buyer has an incentive
to limit, his purchases in order to reduce his input costs and thereby increase his
profits.")
75. Cf. Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.) (determination
of improper merger and monopoly power similar), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1972).
76. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 734, 739-41 (D.
Mass.), oqffd in relevant part, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029
(1985). In Kartell, the court discussed various factors in determining Blue Shield's
market power.
-77. 582 F. Supp. at 739, 741. See also United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336,
1377 (D. Md. 1981). In AT&T, the court appeared to apply the same monopoly share
analysis to a case alleging anticompetitive conduct in procurement practices.
78. Barry v. Blue Cross of California, 805 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1986).
79. As noted supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, according to Areeda and
Turner, a monopsonist will not abuse its power unless the product is produced at
increasing costs, since only then would it be able to obtain increased monopsonistic
profits. If the firm engages in exclusionary behavior to obtain or maintain its position
at the first or second level, however, its conduct may have an anticompetitive effect by
raising barriers to entry and prohibiting free competition at either level. See also infra
notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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tion chain, and to obtain an increase in market power and
share at either level.
1.

Monopsony Power-Anticompetitive Effect
Complaints involving a purchaser's price setting activities
under section 2 have usually been unsuccessful.' The court's
rationale has generally rested on an absence of anticompetitive
effect-either because there was no allegation of monopsony
power,8 1 or, if monopsony was properly alleged, because there
was no allegation of facts that would lead to the necessary
anticompetitive effects of decreased output or increased price
within a monopsony market.8 2
2. Judicial Treatment of Monopsony Power
a.

Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding

The problems with alleging and proving the requisite
anticompetitive effect are exemplified in Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding.' In Garshman, the court found that a
claim by natural gas producers against a pipeline company and
its parent, a public utility, for monopsonization in the purchase
of natural gas failed to state a cause of action.8" The complaint
alleged that the pipeline company threatened the natural gas
producers with economic reprisal and future refusals to deal if
they refused to agree to price concessions. The producers'
brief alleged that the pipeline company's actions constituted an
attempt to restrict output by producers and increase the price
paid by consumers.
The court rejected the contentions raised in the complaint
and stated that "the only motivation attributable to [the pipeline company] is (1) an intent to reduce the price it pays to producers,. .. (2) an intent to reduce its take-or-pay obligations by
80. Courts reviewing these complaints have either dismissed the complaint, see
e.g., Garshman, 641 F. Supp. at 1370 (contract purchaser of natural gas), or even
reversed and vacated a trial court's ruling, see, e.g., Kartell, 749 F.2d at 931 (medical
insurance company set price it would pay to providers). Even if the complaint survives
a motion to dismiss, however, the court may uphold a later summary judgment motion.
Portland Retail, Etc. v. Kaiser Foundation, 662 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1980), on remand
and appeal, De Modena v. Kaiser Found., 743 F.2d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985).
81. See infra note 10.
82. See, e.g., Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927 (no reduced output, thus no anticompetitive
effect). See also Garshman, 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.N.J. 1986).
83. 641 F. Supp. 1359 (D.N.J. 1986).
84. Id. at 1369.
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reducing prices,... and (3) an intent to retain all available gas
under the contract.1s5 The court found that even if every allegation was proved, the pipeline company's conduct could not
have violated section 2. Rather, the plaintiff's complaint
should have alleged that the transaction either excluded competition or suppressed supply in order to maintain a monopsony and increase prices charged to consumers."
The error of the Garshman plaintiffs, then, lay in their
failure to allege the proper anticompetitive effects of the pipeline company's conduct, such as decreased output or reduced
competition. The court refused to accept contentions of
increased price or decreased output, which were arguably
alleged in the producer's brief, but not contained in the complaint.87 Additionally, it does not appear that the plaintiffs
alleged a factual basis supporting an allegation of decreased
output and increased price in a monopsony market. These requisites will be discussed below.
b.

Monopsony Anticompetitive Effects Test

Courts and scholars have generally considered monopsony
power to have an anticompetitive effect only if a large-scale
88
buyer restricts output, thereby injuring competition.
Reduced output injuring competition is the same economic
89
effect used to condemn monopoly power. In the buyer's market reduced output may occur if the monopsonist sets its
purchase price below the product's average cost. Pricing below
average cost would inevitably force the less efficient or marginal suppliers to drop out of the market since those suppliers
whose costs exceed the most efficient will not recover their
actual costs. The marginal producers will then switch to production of a second product that would not have been chosen
in a competitive market. This inefficiency parallels that of
monopoly.90
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1370.
87. Id. at 1368-69. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court is not allowed to
"flesh out," or amend, a complaint by reference to the brief. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
88. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927; Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $J65,629 at 69,185; 4 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 32, 964, at 201.
89. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
90. Areeda and Turner theorize that the problems inherent in seller concentration
parallels that of buyer concentration. In each case output is decreased-in the seller's
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As noted above, 9' however, the threatened loss of a supplier may be an incentive for a monopsonist to refrain from
engaging in anticompetitive behavior. Without a supplier, the
purchaser is unable to continue its manufacturing, wholesaling,
or retailing operations. If the seller-manufacturer cannot easily convert its operation to another activity, however, then the
monopsonist may more easily abuse its power without fear of
losing its supplier. 92 This same opportunity for abuse is found
in monopoly. Of course, occasionally the purchaser may be acting with an exclusionary intent and the loss of a supplier may
be the precise result sought by the purchaser.
The above analogy to monopoly is incomplete. Unlike the
monopolist, the monopsonist will theoretically have the capability and, thus, the incentive to indulge in anticompetitive
behavior only if three conditions are met: (1) the buyer possesses significant market power, that is, its purchases are
numerous enough to have an appreciable effect on total output;
(2) the buyer's purchases are for a product that has a rising
cost curve, that is, one for which each successive unit produced
costs more to produce than the last one; and (3) the buyer possesses the power to restrict its purchases to a particular
amount.9 3 If these conditions are present, a rational large scale
purchaser will limit its purchases to a smaller quantity of
goods at a lower price than would exist in a freely competitive
market.
The first condition, market power, is a necessary requirement of the section 2 requirement discussed above. 94 The second condition is a reiteration of Areeda and Turner's assertion
that a monopsonist will not reduce its purchases if the product
has a constant cost curve, but only if the product is produced
under conditions of increasing cost.9' The third condition recmarket by the ability to increase prices above competitive levels, and in the buyer's
market by the ability to depress prices below competitive levels. 4 AREEDA & TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 32,

964 ("The principal reason for concern with undue

buyer concentration parallels that for concern with undue seller concentration.").
91. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
92. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 17; POSNER, supra note 74, at 93 ("filf the
machinery used to make widgets can be used just as productively to make gidgets, the
sole purchaser of widgets will not be able to force the widget makers to accept a
monopsony price.").
93. Custom Auto Body, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,185; 4 AREEDA &
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 32, 964(a).
94. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.

708

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:687

ognizes that some industries, particularly regulated industries,
may not have the ability to restrict purchases. If so, then it
will not meet the Chicago School's condition of reduced input
(and consequently reduced output) leading to an anticompetitive effect in the marketplace.
This test assumes the recent economic emphasis on
decreased output and increased price. Even if relying exclusively upon economic theorists, if the monopsonist has
engaged in exclusionary activities then this analysis would be
incomplete and additional factors relating to the monopsonist's
incentive should be considered. Thus, the first element, market power, may be determined under the Krattenmaker and
Salop test of raising rivals' costs. The second and third elements may similarly require reconsideration. Litigants and
courts should similarly consider the antitrust goals of decentralization and promotion of small business when determining
those circumstances in which a monopsonist's activities should
be curtailed.
c.

Custom Autobody v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

The Areeda and Turner test has apparently been used by
only one court, the federal District Court of Rhode Island. In
Custom Autobody v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.," automobile repair shops alleged that an insurance company conspired
with the company's insureds to aggregate the company's buying power and restrain trade. The claim was brought under
section 1, which requires concerted action, rather than section
2, which requires monopoly or monopsony power.
In reviewing defendant's summary judgment motion, the
court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the claim should
be reviewed under a per se analysis, and sua sponte proceeded
9 7 Earlier in its
to review the claim under the rule of reason.
opinion the court found that the insurance company's agreements with the repair shops could have substantial pro-competitive effects, 98 effectively precluding any application of the
per se rule. The court, however, did not proceed to apply a
typical section 1 rule of reason analysis. The plaintiff had
alleged that the defendant had "used its position as a largescale buyer to enter into provider agreements that depress the
96. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,194.
97. Id. at 69,184-85.
98. Id. at 69,184.
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price of automobile repairs below competitive levels."'
Relying on this assertion, the court restated the claim to allege
monopsony power in order to determine if the claim would
then allege sufficient anticompetitive effect to survive summary judgment. 1°" While the court did not state that it was
reviewing the claim under section 2, for purposes of this Comment this inference may be drawn since section 1 generally has
no marketpower requirement. 10 1
The plaintiff in Custom Autobody presented no evidence
relating to the first .two elements of the previously discussed
monopsony anticompetitive effect test-market share and rising cost curve. Therefore, the court was able to review only
the third element, ability to restrict purchases. 0 2 Arguably,
the insurance company did not have this ability since it was
required to arrange for the repair of its insureds' vehicles
under the terms of its insurance contract. The court, however,
noted that it was equally arguable that the insurance company
could arrange for its preferred shops to do inferior quality
work.10 3 The court thus found that the insurance company
99. Id. at 69,185-86.
100. Id. at 69,185.
101. One author has asserted that the Custom Autobody court's analysis was
improper under section 1, and did not constitute a restatement of the claim under
section 2. Rovner, supra note 5, at 871-72 ("the court's conclusion that an exercise of
monopsony power to depress price can sustain a section 1 rule of reason claim,
particularly when no section 2 monopsonization claim is alleged, is unsound .... ITMhe
court's view that a unilateral exercise of monopsony power can amount to an
unreasonable trade restraint violative of section 1 is wrong.").
In arguing that such an approach is inappropriate because it asserts that "a
monopsonist could be attacked under § I as an unreasonable trade restraint even if the
monopolist had attained its market status legally under section 2," Rovner, supra note
5, at 871-72, Rovner ignores that the court had applied Areeda & Turner's monopsony
anticompetitive effects test precisely to determine if the insurance company had
engaged in the act of monopsonization, and did not merely state that monopsony
power alone was bad. This is the classic test for a § 2 violation: whether "a firm
acquires or maintains monopoly power by means which constitute restraints of trade
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act ..
" SULLVAN, supra note 31, at 98.
For purposes of this Comment the case will be treated as if the court did in fact
restate the claim and analyze the violation under § 2. Such an assumption is consistent
with the opinion. The court's analysis may also be affirmed under § 1, however, since
market power is one test of reasonableness and may be reviewed in a § 1 case when
the anticompetitive effect of the conduct is not self evident. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110-111 n.42 (1985).
102. Custom Autobody, 1983-2 Trade Cas. at 69,186.
103. See supra note 34-35 and accompanying text discussing the Krattenmaker and
Salop test. One case to review monopsony and backward integration in terms of
consumer welfare is Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979),
affd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981). In Shapiro, the
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could restrict the quality, rather than the quantity, of its
purchases. Reduction of quality, however, was equated to
reduction of output for repair services.
The decisions in both Custom Autobody and Garshman
clearly reflect the need for the plaintiff to: (1) recognize that
its monopsony claim is properly brought under section 2;
(2) allege decreased output and increased price, or other recognizable antitrust injury, rather than merely lost profits, in its
complaint; and, (3) allege facts supporting an incentive to
engage in such behavior in a monopsony market. If the court
has not embraced the Chicago School of thought, then the
plaintiff may assert an anticompetitive effect resting on decentralization of the market.
B. Abuse of Monopsony Power
As noted earlier, the anticompetitive effect test may be
different for various exclusionary activities. Therefore, this
Comment will review some of these activities: price fixing,
refusals to deal, and vertical integration. In the case of such
exclusionary activity, the test advanced by Krattenmaker and
Salop may be the most appropriate10 4
1. Price Fixing
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing if it is
imposed pursuant to concerted action. Price fixing by a single
firm does not present a cognizable claim under section 1.105
Section l's prohibition is limited to agreements to fix prices to
be charged to third parties and not prices between the contracting parties themselves."° Thus, a seller's agreement to
sell its products at the price set by a purchaser does not meet
the concerted action requirement of section 1. If the claim is
brought under section 2 and the firm possesses monopoly or
monopsony power, however, a single firm may be prohibited
from fixing prices. Without monopoly or monopsony power, a
court rejected the plaintiffs antitrust claim for failure to allege and prove sufficient
anticompetitive effects. As noted by the court, "Language about the 'market for
innovation' is an effort by plaintiffs to temper their profit making motives with a
general appeal to overall consumer welfare." Shapiro, 472 F. Supp. at 641.
104. Custom Autobody, 1983-2 Trade Cas. at 69,186.
105. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984); Garshman,
641 F. Supp. at 413 n.1.
106. Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1371
(D.N.J. 1986).
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single firm will not have the requisite anticompetitive effect on
the marketplace that is the crux of the Sherman Act.10 7
While concerted action involving price will generally be
considered illegal per se, 10 8 a monopolist's or monopsonist's
price setting activities will be reviewed to determine if they
constitute an abuse of that power. Thus, a monopolist or
monopsonist may often exploit its market power and set the
price at which it will purchase or sell goods without incurring
antitrust liability."° As the Supreme Court stated in Cargill,
"[I]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms
to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition."11 0 Thus, it has been held that the antitrust laws do not
prohibit a buyer from "bargaining for the best deal possible;"' l
that a monopsonist's ability to obtain a price lower than that
available to an individual purchaser may merely reflect its
market power and its ability to "[drive] a hard bargain."''Il
Similarly, a monopolist will not incur antitrust liability merely
for setting the price at which it will sell its products. 113 Only if
107. See, e.g., Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Connecticut, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982) (in absence of claim of monopsony
power, plaintiffs could not assert anticompetitive effect necessary to prevent summary
judgment of price fixing claims); Webster County Memorial Hos. Inc. v. United Mine
Workers of Am. Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. 1976)
(antitrust price fixing claim dismissed in absence of allegation of monopsony power).
See also De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984)
(attempted monopsony claim alleging price fixing in buyer's market dismissed because
of lack of anticompetitive effect-no monopsony alleged), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1229
(1985). Price fixing is illegal under § 1 whether it has the effect of "raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity ...." United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1939). Although the courts have expressed
reluctance in finding monopsony claims to be illegal because "the prices at issue ...
are low prices, not high prices," Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d
922, 930 (1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985), this reluctance would appear to be
misplaced even in a § 2 case.
108. Thus, buyer cartels that force the price that suppliers charge the members of
the cartel below the competitive level have generally been declared illegal per se
under § 1. See supra note 41. The Court's recent decision in Business Electronics Co.
v. Sharp Electronics Co., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988), has made it clear, however, that
vertical agreements must set price or price levels before they will be considered illegal
per se.
109. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
110. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 492 (quoting Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1036 (1984)).
111. Brillhart v. Mutual Medical Ins., 768 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1985).
112. De Modena v. Kaiser Found., 743 F.2d at 1395. See also Kartell, 749 F.2d at
928.
113. Trace Chemical, Inc. v. Canadian Indus., 738 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1984), cert
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the monopolist's or monopsonist's pricing is predatory will its
price setting activities generally be considered anticompetitive
and subject the monopolist or monopsonist to antitrust
liability.
Predatory pricing meets the anticompetitive effect requirement of the antitrust laws by harming competitors without any
countervailing benefit to consumers." 4 It has been loosely
defined by the Supreme Court as "pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competition
in the short run and reducing competition in the long run.115
however, to identify the "appropriate
The Court has declined,
' 116
cost.
of
measure
In defining the appropriate measure of cost, a court must
7
distinguish between a competitive and a predatory price."
The antitrust laws will not protect a competitor from a loss of
profits because of price competition, or forbid competition for
increased market share. 1 18 Predatory pricing that is aimed at
the elimination of competition, however, is prohibited. The
"appropriate measure of cost" must, therefore, distinguish
between these two types of pricing.
In determining whether a price is predatory, courts and
commentators generally have rejected a subjective test based
on intent and have adopted some form of objective test. The
most well-recognized test for defining the appropriate measure
1 9 This objective test
is that enunciated by Areeda and Turner.
12° According to
is usually defined as below cost pricing.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). It has been suggested that the Court's assertion in
Mandeville Island that "simply using size to drive a hard bargain is not necessarily
illegal" may suggest that § 2 of the Sherman Act was not meant to reach
monopsonization. See Rovner, supra note 5, at 868. Such an assertion, however,
ignores that the use of monopoly power in general is not considered improper. Thus, a
monopolist may freely sell at any price it chooses; the mere fact of its size does not
make this activity illegal. Rather, improper use of its size is illegal. Thus, at this stage,
there is no distinction to be made between monopoly and monopsony, and any such
inference from such language is erroneous.
114. See, e.g., MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1112-13 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975)
[hereinafter Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing].
115. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 493.
116. See id.
117. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT'T Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
118. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 492.
119. Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing,supra note 115.
120. Id. at 712.
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Areeda and Turner, pricing below marginal or average variable
cost is presumptively illegal. 2 ' Conversely, pricing above marginal or average variable cost is presumptively legal.'2 2
The Areeda and Turner test has not been wholly
embraced by the courts. Some courts have altered this formulation to encompass certain fixed costs considered variable over
the long run.'2 3 Other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, consider pricing above average total cost illegal if accompanied by
anticompetitive intent. 24 The Supreme Court has recently
121. Id. at 732-33. Areeda and Turner use the accounting term "average variable
cost" as the surrogate for the economic concept of marginal cost. This facilitates
determination of predatory pricing by providing a measurable formula. Variable costs
are those costs that vary with output and would include direct materials, direct labor,
fuel, maintenance, and other costs directly incurred to produce the product. Average
variable cost is the total variable cost divided by the number of units produced.
122. Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing,supra note 114, at 732-33. See also D. E.
Rogers Assoc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1437 (6th Cir. 1983).
123. Variable cost will generally measure only the short term marginal cost. A
second measure, long-run incremental cost (LRIC), may also be used. LRIC
represents the average cost of adding an entire new service or product rather than
merely the cost of the last unit of production. See A. KAHN, 1 THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 65-66 (1970); Baumol, Quasi-Permanenceof Price Reductions: A Policy
for Preventionfor Predatory Pricing,89 YALE LJ. 1 (1979); Joskow & Klevorick, A
Framework for Analyzing PredatoryPricingPolicy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979). See also
MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1119-1120. LRIC will, therefore, measure all the
costs of adding a new product or service-fixed as well as variable. Under the LRIC
approach all costs will soon become variable. Such an approach may be particularly
useful to capital-intensive processes where plant and equipment are relied upon
heavily.
124. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.)
(pricing above average total costs may be deemed predatory upon showing of predatory
intent), cert denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (pricing below average total cost
and above average variable cost may be predatory if accompanied by predatory intent),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
Under this test, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case upon proof that the
defendant charged prices below average variable cost. The burden is then on the
defendant to show "that the prices were justified without regard to any anticipated
destructive effect they might have on competitors." William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1036.
Conversely, if the price is above average variable cost, but below average total cost, the
burden will remain on the plaintiff to establish the predatory nature of the pricing.
Thus, although the plaintiff bears the burden in such cases, the Ninth Circuit will
recognize predatory pricing above average variable if "the defendant sacrificed greater
profits or incurred greater losses than necessary, in order to eliminate the plaintiff."
Id. at 1036.
In Transamerica Computer Co., the Ninth Circuit extended its prior rulings to
hold that average total cost pricing occasionally may sustain a monopolization claim if
the plaintiff offers "clear and convincing evidence" of predatory pricing. 698 F.2d at
1388. Other circuits have declined to adopt the TransamericaComputer Co. extension.
See, e.g., Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056, 1058
(6th Cir. 1984); Barry Wright Corp. v. IT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233-36 (1st Cir.
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declined to determine if recovery should ever be available
when the pricing is above incremental cost or whether "abovecost pricing coupled with predatory intent is ever sufficient to
state a claim of predation."'"
The occurence of predatory pricing is generally criticized
short
on the ground that it requires the monopolist to incur
2 6 This
term losses when the return is inherently uncertain.'
same criticism may not be levied against monopsony. The
courts have indicated that in a monopsony case the relevant
costs would be those of the plaintiff-purchaser. In such a case,
the loss.1 27
the seller, not the monopsonist, would be incurring
In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts,Inc., the court noted
that none of the parties "point[ed] to evidence of any price
below anyone's. 'incremental cost.'"128 Similarly, in De
29
Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,1 the court
1983). Although the Transamerica court did not find sufficient evidence of intent to
support a finding of predatory pricing, subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have found
pricing above average total cost to be predatory. See, e.g., Western Concrete Structures
Ct. 230
Co. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
1985).
Cir.
(9th
1348
1342,
F.2d
786
Co.,
Transp.
Trail
Fe
Santa
v.
Transp.
Farley
(1985);
1984).
Cir.
(9th
1194
1184,
But see Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d
also
125. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 493 n.12 (1986); see
(1986).
n.9
585
574,
U.S.
475
Matshurhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,
126. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. See also BORK, supra note 32, at 153-54; 3 Areeda
& Turner, ANTrrRusT LAw, supra note 32, at 711b, 151.
127. It may be inappropriate for the courts to look exclusively at the plaintiffs
actual costs since these may be higher than the industry's average costs. Additionally,
may not
intent may be an even greater consideration in a monopsony case since intent
may
be inferred from the fact of pricing below variable cost. The inference of intent
been
have
may
defendant
the
since
suit
monopsony
a
in
inappropriate
be particularly
unaware of the plaintiff's costs, or average costs. The plaintiff should not be required
be
to present proof of such knowledge, or of facts from which such an inference can
made. Of course, many courts outside of the Ninth Circuit do not accept an inference
Co. v.
of predatory intent from the act of pricing below cost. See, e.g., Indiana Grocery
(S.D.
426
418,
(BNA)
REPORTER
REG.
Super Valu Stores, Inc., 54 ANTITRUST & TRADE
Ind. 1988).
128. 749 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1984) (emphasis supplied).
had
129. 743 F.2d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). The court also noted that no evidence
been shown that the defendants had subsequently "sold drugs to their members below
the cost of acquiring the drugs." De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1395. This would be a typical
of
predatory pricing claim, but in this case other insurance companies, i.e. competitors
the
to
opposed
as
suit,
bring
to
standing
with
ones
the
be
would
the defendant,
pharmacists. Additionally, the facts of DeModena do not support such an analysis since
than
the purchaser presumably would be paying higher than normal prices rather
104 Wash. 2d
lower. See, e.g., Seattle Rendering Works, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.,
suppliers
15, 21, 701 P.2d 502, 507 (1985) (purchaser paid higher than normal rates to
court
without any predatory intent). In discussing the claim, the Seattle Rendering
stated:
We note that this is not a traditional below-cost pricing case. The usual belowcost pricing case involves a firm lowering its prices so that the new price is
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noted that the plaintiffs had offered "no evidence of predatory
intent, such as proof that [defendants] coerced pharmaceutical
companies into selling drugs to them below cost." It may be
argued that this activity is an example of unfair trade practices
that are not violative of section 2.1' The court's language,
referring to "below cost" and "incremental cost," however,
indicates an intention by the court to analogize such an action
to the rules relating to predatory pricing.
2.

Refusal to Deal and Vertical Integration

A purchaser's or seller's unilateral action in refusing to
deal131 with another will not generally result in antitrust liability. As stated in United States v. Colgate & Co.:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.' 32
As this statement reflects, a monopolist or monopsonist
may have an added obligation to deal fairly."an Its refusal to
deal, however, will not be considered a per se offense. 1' 4
below what it cost to make that product. The facts presented here are
different in that the price of the finished product stayed the same, but cost of
the raw materials needed to make the product rose. Analytically, this
distinction is irrelevant. Seattle Rendering, 104 Wash. 2d at 21 n.2, 701 P.2d at
506.
130. See, e.g., A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302,1308 (9th Cir. 1984);
Northwest Power Prod., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 125
(D. Mass.), affd, 508 F.2d 547 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975)
(rejecting Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (ist Cir.), cert
denied. 286 U.S. 552 (1932), rule of per se illegality and requiring proof of
anticompetitive effect).
131. A refusal to deal may be implied. Thus, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927), the Court found that the defendant's
refusal to sell to the plaintiff except at over-the-counter prices was unreasonable and
was effectively a refusal to deal. Similarly, in Six Twenty-Nine Productions Inc. v.
Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966), a radio station's refusal to pay
normal commission rates for material prepared by an advertising agency was found to
be a refusal to deal.
132. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
133. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979).
134. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307. In contrast, concerted refusals to deal are often
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In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Co.,l5 the
Supreme Court held that there was no general duty to cooperate with competitors unless the monopolist's refusal was
3
unreasonably "exclusionary" or predatory." As noted by the
court, "if a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some
basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory. '137 Thus, if a monopsonist or a monopolist
acts with the purpose of excluding competitors, its refusal to
deal may result in a violation of section 2.
Although a monopsonist's price setting activities or refusals to deal may be insufficient to subject it to antitrust liability,
in some cases liability may be imposed if these activities are a
13
means of accomplishing vertical integration. 8 A business vertically integrates when it obtains a certain amount of control
over the distribution or sale of its products at another level of
the production-distribution chain. Often this integration
results in procompetitive effects such as better products or
lower prices.'3 9 Vertical integration may have anticompetitive
effects, however, such as foreclosing competition or increasing
barriers to entry. Anticompetitive effects may not only be felt
at the first level, but may also result in the acquisition of a
monopoly at the second level.' 40
Since a monopsonist's vertical integration by refusing to
or
deal with a supplier may have either procompetitive 14
per se. 1
illegal
be
cannot
conduct
its
effects,
anticompetitive
Neither a monopolist nor a monopsonist is subject to antitrust
per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966).
135. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
136. See id. at 603.
137. Id. at 605 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 138 (1978)).
138. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Lorain Journal Co.
v.United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Poster Exchange v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1970) (supplier refused to sell to resaler in order to eliminate competition
at the distributor level), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
725-26; POSNER,
139. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 32,
supra note 74, at 704-708.
140. See infra text accompanying note 169; see also Note, New Analysis, supra
note 5, at 402-05. Anticompetitive results may occur since competitors may often be
more innovative than monopolists. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 129.
141. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1948); Paschall v.
Kansas City Star, 695 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp.
1336, 1373 (D. Md. 1981).
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liability merely because it competes vigorously.'12 In some
cases, however, its refusal to deal to attain vertical integration
may satisfy the second element of monopsonization (monopolization), willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly or
monopsony power.14 3 A section 2 claim may be stated if a
monopsonist's vertical integration creates monopoly power and
is accompanied by an intent to exclude competition, gain a
competitive advantage, or destroy competition.'" In the presence of monopsony power, liability for a monopsonist's backward integration may, thus, be imposed upon proof of
(1) specific intent to monopsonize, or (2) anticompetitive
effects that result from the monopsonist's actions. 145
a.

Specific Intent

In the context of vertical integration, specific intent may
be shown by evidence that vertical integration is part of "a calculated scheme to gain control over an appreciable segment of
the market and to restrain or suppress competition, rather
than an expansion to meet legitimate business needs."'1 Specific intent may be shown either by direct proof or, indirectly,
by proof of anticompetitive conduct or by proof that the
monopolist or monopsonist engaged in predatory tactics or
"dirty tricks.' 47 This latter use of the antitrust laws to prevent unfair competition has been resoundingly criticized.' 4s
While such tactics may be reprehensible, they are not -the kind
of activity that the Sherman Act seeks to curb. These tactics
will rarely demonstrate the anticompetitive effect that is the
target of the antitrust laws.
Valid business justifications may negate liability premised
on specific intent. 49 Thus, if the defendant is able to plead and
142. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1373.
143. Kansas City Star, 727 F.2d at 696 (newspaper's refusal to deal with former
carriers). See also supra text accompanying note 53.
144. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); AT&T, 524 F.
Supp. at 1373 (abuse of purchasing power). See also VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 67,
at § 8.02[1] at 5 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
145. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. at 531-32; Griffith, 334 US. at 105.
146. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948) (citing
United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920)).
147. Kansas City Star, 727 F.2d at 697 (no dirty tricks found); Byars v. Bluff City
New Co., 609 F.2d 843, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1979), on remand and appeal, 683 F.2d 981, 983
(6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (latter court found no dirty tricks).
148. 3 AREEDA & TURER, ANTrrRusT LAW, supra note 32, 728(c)(5).
149. Kansas City Star, 727 F.2d at 698. But see United States v. AT&T, 524 F.
Supp. 1336 (D. Md. 1981).
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prove that its conduct was motivated by sound business judgment, the plaintiff will generally need to rely solely on an
anticompetitive effect argument. The mere assertion of business justifications, however, will not avoid liability premised on
specific intent.
i. Anticompetitive Conduct
One court reviewing a case involving a claim in the buyer's
market has relied upon the defendant's anticompetitive conduct to support an inference of specific intent. In United
States v. American Telephone and Telegraph," the government charged AT&T with reinforcing and exploiting its structural incentives to its purchasing agents. These incentives
influenced the agents to purchase equipment, without regard
to price, from related companies rather than from independent
sources.' 51 Evidence presented by the government indicated
that the company would not purchase independent products,
but would implement crash programs to develop competing
products; that employees were under pressure to buy from
related companies--even at increased prices and poorer quality; and, that detailed justifications were required to purchase
52
companies. 1
from independent firms, but not from related
Despite the defendant's assertion that purchasing decisions
were made pursuant to "reasonable engineering and sound
business judgment which should not be second-guessed by the
Court," 15 3 the court found that sufficient evidence of anticom5 4 Thus,
petitive conduct had been shown to survive dismissal.'
despite the assertion that its conduct was a result of "sound
business judgment," it was insufficient to defeat a claim based
on anticompetitive conduct as a basis for drawing an inference
of specific intent.
ii.

Predatory Pricing and Dirty Tricks

As noted earlier, predatory pricing violates the antitrust
laws. 1 55 Generally, it is defined as pricing below variable cost.
150. 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D. Md. 1981).
151. Id. at 1370.
152. Id. at 1371.
153. Id. at 1372.
to
154. Id. at 1372. Defendant presented no evidence of valid business justification
the
on
solely
rely
to
refused
court
the
and
contentions,
government's
rebut the
defendant's assertion of valid business reasons.
155. See supra notes 105-07, 114.
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Predatory pricing is not necessarily pricing below variable cost,
however, and may be any price that is designed to exclude
competition." s Thus, a price above variable cost may be predatory if it raises rivals' costs and inevitably leads a competitor to
withdraw from the market. As noted by Krattenmaker and
Salop, the supplier's costs may increase if the purchaser "is
vertically integrated into the production of some fraction of its
input needs or if its input purchase price is protected by long
term contract or superior bargaining ability."'5 7 Action
designed to increase a supplier's cost for the purpose of excluding the supplier and vertically integrating into the input market should thus be considered predatory and a violation of the
antitrust laws.
Dirty tricks have been alleged in integration cases, but are
generally unsuccessful in supporting the anticompetitive conduct prong."s This lack of success may be a reflection of the
general notion that unfair competition claims are to be governed by tort law rather than by antitrust law.159 To be successful, the plaintiff alleging dirty tricks must generally show
that the dirty tricks are predatory or have resulted in an
anticompetitive effect.1l "
b.

Anticompetitive Effect-Backward Integration
Specific intent 16 ' is necessary "only where the acts fall
short of the results condemned in the Act." '
Therefore, in
the absence of specific intent, proof of the anticompetitive
effect of the monopsonist's actions can result in liability.
Proponents of the Chicago School of Economics focus on
allocative efficiency and argue that a monopolist at any single
level of a distribution chain can recover all monopoly profits
156. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 493; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,

32,

spra note

, 737, 738.
157. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34 at 238.
158. See supra note 147. See also Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.
1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 63,512 (5th Cir. 1980) (court rejected per se rule, but found
that acts of unfair competition had an anticompetitive effect); Hunt-Wesson Prods. v.
Ragu Foods, Inc. 627 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1980) (predatory promotional conduct could
have made entry more difficult), cert denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); 1 CALLMAN, supra
note 5, § 4.03; 16B VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 66, 10.04.
Abuse of governmental process may be a particularly effective "dirty trick." See
BORIK, supra note 32, at 159-60; 16B VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 66, § 10.04(3).
159. See supra notes 130, 148 and accompanying text.
160. See also supra note 158.

161. See supra text accompanying note 145.
162. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. at 105.
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available in that chain. A double monopolist of two successive
levels will not make more monopoly profits than a single
monopolist. Thus, there is little incentive to attempt vertical
integration.163 This analysis, however, is generally inapplicable
to backward integration because the monopsonist is able to
gain more profits (both monopsonistic/monopolistic and nonmonopsonistic/monopolistic) by its ability to control both the
price it charges and the price it pays. Although the forward
integrationist is able to do this once it integrates, it has already
taken all of the monopoly profits available in the end-product's
price from the point of its original entry. The backward integrationist, however, may have had to split such profits with its
supplier. By integrating into its source of supply, the backward
integrationist is assured that it will be able to take all monopoly/monopsony profits in that chain. Thus, the monopsonist
that attains backward integration is able to profit from its position in two successive levels. 16 While this analysis rebuts the
increased monopoly/monopsony profit argument, it does not
rebut the Chicago School's underlying argument that there is
no anticompetitive effect in the form of increased prices or
decreased output to consumers, since the end price and output
will presumably remain the same at the monopolistic price.
Such an anticompetitive effect may be shown by increased
barriers to entry. The Chicago School, however, argues that
entry barriers will be erected only if the integrated business is
5
more efficient than its unintegrated competitors.16 Even
according to the Chicago School of thought, however, an
anticompetitive effect may be shown in certain fact situations.
The courts have often recited three such fact situations in
which a refusal to deal as part of a vertical integration scheme
is anticompetitive: (1) where integration allows price discrimination so that the monopolist or monopsonist can reap the
163. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10 at 150-51; 2 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,

supra note 32, 725b (no "double" monopoly profit).
164. Note, New Analysis, supra note 5, at 403 ("The argument that a monopolist at
any one level in a production chain captures all the available monopoly profits ignores
the monopsony profits available to the insurer."). In some circumstances, the
monopolist may also have had monopsony power, which it may use to extract
monopsony profits from its supplier. In contrast to monopoly, a monopsonist would
have little effect upon a third level supplier, e.g., a raw material supplier to the
monopsonist's supplier. The more unrefined the product, the more likely that the
supplier will have a greater number of purchasers.
165. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 1979); E.
SULLIVAN AND H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw PoLicY AND PROCEDURE 481 (1984).
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maximum monopoly or monopsony profit from different purchasers or sellers; (2) where integration erects first-level entry
barriers so that potential competitors are stymied; and
(3) where integration permits evasion of regulation of profits
from monopoly or monopsony. 1" The first and third of these
are generally limited to specific industries."6 7 Increased barriers to entry, however, may create anticompetitive effects in
many industries.
Increased barriers to entry may be shown if other firms
would be forced to operate at two levels simultaneously. Theoretically, firms would be required to do so only if: (1) operation at the second level alone required doing business with the
monopsonist; (2) the monopolist/monopsonist ceased dealing
with outsiders; and (3) dual entry would be more difficult than
entry at a single level. These conditions would be met if the
monopsonist covered virtually all of the market.' 68
In discussing forward and backward integration it is
important to realize that the backward integrationist will usually use its monopsony power to integrate into its source of
supply. When it achieves backward integration it may have
both a monopsony and a monopoly at the second level. Its
newly acquired monopoly power, however, may be barely beneficial since it is its own primary purchaser. This new monopoly power, however, may enable it to prevent new entrants at
the first level since all of its competitors would now be
required to purchase their supplies from it, presumably at a
higher price. 69 Thus, it may be the use of its monopoly power,
166. Becker, 713 F.2d at 370; Byars, 609 F.2d at 861; Note, Refusals to Deal
by
Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1720, 1727-28 (1974) [hereinafter
Note, Refusals to Deal].
167. Certain purchasers may be segregated, so that some will be willing to pay
more than another for a similar (perhaps more refined) or identical product. The
monopolist is then in a position to price its product discriminatorily and reap the
maximum monopoly profits from each purchaser, and not merely the average
monopoly profits. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTrRusT LAw, supra note 32. 1 725(e). This
argument may not be identical for monopsony, however.

A regulated monopolist or monopsonist may integrate into another level of

production where it may evade regulation and recoup the monopoly or monopsony
profits available in that chain of production. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRuST LAW,

supra note 32,
integrationists.

726(e). This potential is available for both forward and backward

168. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 32,
726.
169. In antitrust lingo, this effect is often called a "price squeeze." An integrated

monopsonist's ability to control supply, however, would also give it the ability to

conduct a "supply squeeze." See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 236. This is

apparently what occurred in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 US. 207
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not its monopsony power at the first level, that will create the
harmful effect from backward integration. Its monopsony
power at the first level, however, may enable it to prevent
entry at the second level thus requiring all new entrants to
enter both markets simultaneously. Thus, a monopsonist's
backward integration may result in increased barriers to entry
not only by increasing its own economies of scale and increasing the capital required to enter the first market, but also by
requiring simultaneous entry at two levels.
If a monopolist or monopsonist has the power to force
simultaneous entry at both levels, potential competition may
be reduced in a variety of ways. First, the amount of capital
and the level of technological skill necessary for entry would
increase. Second, integration may increase the minimum level
of efficient operation in the industry thereby limiting entry
only to larger firms. 7 ° Thus, if a monopsonist only partially
integrates (e.g., a widget manufacturer integrates into a single
input market when several inputs are necessary to manufacture its widgets), there will be less chance of reduced entry
than if it fully integrates (e.g., widget manufacturer has one
major input and integrates into and monopolizes that
market) .171
The majority of vertical integration cases have dealt with
monopolists and forward integration rather than monopsonists
and backward integration. This distinction is not without its
problems, and it has been noted that backward integration generally cannot extend a monopolist's market control into the
second level or increase barriers to entry. If the monopolist
has both monopoly and monopsony power, however, then
backward integration into a level in which the monopolist possesses monopsony power has consequences identical to those of
(1959). In Kors, the court found that an appliance chain restricted competition
through use of its buying power to deny a source of competitive supply to the plaintiff.
The practice placed the plaintiff at a disadvantage by preventing the plaintiff from
purchasing certain brands of appliances on the same terms of sale and delivery as the
defendant.
170. Note, Refusals to Deal, supra note 166, at 1729. Recently in Cargill, the
Supreme Court noted that capital requirements and "cost and delays" of building new
plants should not generally be taken into account, because the unused facilities and
equipment of those forced out of the market would be available to new entrants. Thus,
the court should look at whether barriers to entry exist after the firm has eliminated
its competitors. 107 S. Ct. at 494-95 n.15.
171. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, suspra note 32, 726c.
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a monopolist's forward integration. 172 This should not be confused with the restricted manner in which monopsony power
itself has been considered improper.1 73 In this case, we are discussing a monopolist's exclusionary use of its monopsony
power to obtain vertical integration, and not merely price setting.174 The assumptions used by Areeda and Turner may not
apply when the added motive of exclusion, involving additional
economic considerations and effects, is added to the analysis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Abuse of monopsony power, particularly in the backward
integration context, may clearly support an antitrust claim
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The failure of monopsony
claims under section 2 to date is a result of the failure to
closely analyze these claims, rather than the inability of a
seller's action to state a cognizable claim under the antitrust
laws. The claim cannot rest on the loss of profits, but must
allege a cognizable antitrust injury. The factual basis supporting the claimed antitrust injury, and related anticompetitive
effect, is not, however, the same as that required for a traditional monopoly claim. There is a more restricted opportunity
and incentive for a purchaser to gain monopsonistic profits.
When the claimed abuse of monopsony power is exclusionary the court should not restrict itself to the monopsony
anticompetitive effects test, but should review the monopsony
claim with reference to its exclusionary effect on competition.
The monopsony anticompetitive effects test merely defines
those circumstances in which a monopsonist would have both
the ability and the incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct. Additional incentives are present if the monopsonist is
engaging in exclusionary activity. Although predatory pricing
claims have been reviewed with disfavor recently, the types of
activities discussed in this Comment would involve a cost to
the potential competitor-the supplier. Thus, if the monop172. Note, Refusals to Deal, supra note 166, at 1730-31 n.64. See also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 10, § 1.2 at 17; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTrrRuST LAw, supra note 32, 725h
at 207 (increased barriers to entry become significant when monopsony power held in
one market).
173. See monopsony anticompetitive effects test discussed supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
174. In addressing criticisms regarding the plausibility of predatory pricing,
Krattenmaker and Salop have noted that these criticisms do not apply to exclusionary
activities, that "fr]aising rivals' costs can be a particularly effective method of
anticompetitive exclusion." Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 224.
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sonist is seeking to vertically integrate, the supplier, and not
the monopsonist, would be encountering the short term loss in
profits.
Regardless of the type of activity occurring in the buyer's
market, however, it is important that litigators and courts recognize the distinctions between monopoly and monopsony.
Only then will litigants be able to present clear and cogent
pleadings; only then will courts develop rational guidelines for
both buyers and sellers.
Susan E. Foster, CP.A.

